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visible in shifts in the importance of these work goals. Across the 19 countries surveyed twice with the same set of goals questions, 11 out of the 14 goals show significant worldwide shifts in importance between 1967-1969 and 1971-1973 (the figures between parentheses represent points on the standardized scales with standard deviation 100):

<i>More important have become</i>	<i>Less important have become</i>
personal time (+46)	training (-36)
desirable area (+35)	advancement (-36)
challenge (+32)	manager (-35)
earnings (+24)	use of skills (-25)
benefits (+16)	
freedom (+15)	
recognition (+6)	

No systematic shifts across the 19 countries are found for physical conditions (-15), cooperation (-12), and employment security (-1).

Again, there are in-company reasons for some of these shifts. The smaller rate of personnel growth which has reduced opportunities for advancement has definitely affected people's aspirations for advancement and channelled it toward other types of reward, such as earnings. The maturing of the company's technology, which was novel in the 1960s, has definitely reduced the importance of training to some extent. However, not all shifts in goals can be explained this way. A shift from the importance of "use of skills" to the importance of "challenge" is unlikely to have been generated by in-company reasons; nor is there a plausible in-company explanation for the universal shift in the importance of "personal time."

Although some goals are also associated with PDI and UAI, 13 out of the 14 goals relate to IDV and/or MAS. The pattern of association of the goals with "Individualism" and "Masculinity" as we found it in Chapters 5 and 6 is as follows:

<i>Associated with IDV</i>	<i>Associated with MAS</i>
personal time (factor loading .86)	earnings (factor loading .70)
freedom (.49)	recognition (.59)
challenge (.46)	advancement (.56)
use of skills (-.63)	challenge (.54)
physical conditions (-.69)	employment security (-.48)
training (-.82)	desirable area (-.59)
	cooperation (-.69)
	manager (-.69)

(We see that "challenge" appears for both IDV and MAS; "benefits" does not appear, but it is correlated -.40 with IDV).

From the six goals associated with IDV, five shifted significantly toward a larger IDV-score, and the sixth shifted toward a larger IDV, but not significantly so. Thus, there has been a strong tendency for goals to shift toward greater individualism in 1971-1973 than in 1967-1969. This shift can be interpreted from the quite strong association between individualism and national wealth (Chapter 5). From 1967 to

1973, most countries (among the 19 surveyed twice with these goals questions) have become wealthier. This should have increased the individualism of their citizens.

Figure 8.4 shows the result of separate calculations of IDV for the 1967-1969 and for the 1971-1973 data, for the 19 countries surveyed twice with the same questions. There is, indeed, a drastic shift in IDV across the 19 countries (+20 points). However, the poorest country among the 19, Pakistan, which also had the lowest IDV score in 1969, shifted toward a lower IDV. Figure 8.4 shows no convergence in individualism among countries over time: The gap between the two extreme countries in the set of 19 (Pakistan and Great Britain) increased from 60 to 89.

For the eight goals associated with MAS, four shifted significantly toward a larger MAS score, two shifted also toward a larger MAS (but not significantly so), and two (advancement and desirable area) shifted significantly in the opposite direction. Neither of the latter is among those most strongly determining the Masculinity dimension, so we could still expect an overall shift toward greater masculinity. This is borne out by the separate calculations of MAS on 1967-1969 and 1971-1973 data shown in the lower part of Figure 8.4. However, the shift in MAS (+5 across 19 countries) is much weaker than the shift in IDV. We see again the phenomenon that the country lowest in 1968-1969 (Sweden) actually becomes (marginally) lower still, so that the gap between it and the highest country (Austria) increases slightly; once more, there is no sign of convergence. I do not find an easy explanation for an overall increase in masculinity, and the possible origins of high and low MAS scores identified in Chapter 6 (Figure 6.5) do not help to explain it. Compared with the shift in individualism, the shift in masculinity is relatively minor.

Shifts in Work Goal Importance as a Function of Age

We should still investigate whether the shifts in individualism and masculinity are due mainly to maturation, generation, or *Zeitgeist* influences—or to a combination of these. To this purpose we have to look at individualism and masculinity by age group; but in order to avoid a reverse ecological fallacy, we should first study to what extent the importance of individual work goals is affected by the age bracket of the

FIGURE 8.4 Shifts in IDV and MAS Scores Between Two Survey Rounds

	1967-69	1971-73	Difference
IDV-scores:			
19 countries ^a	50	70	+20
Great-Britain (high IDV)	75	101	+26
Pakistan (low IDV)	15	12	-3
MAS-scores:			
19 countries ^a	43	48	+5
Austria (high MAS)	76	81	+5
Sweden (low MAS)	7	5	-2

^aAUT, BEL, DEN, FIN, FRA, GBR, GER, IRA, IRE, ISR, NET, NOR, PAK, SAF, SPA, SWE, SWI, TUR.

respondents. Besides the HERMES data, there exists a fairly extensive literature on the relationship between age and work goal importance (Hofstede, 1980b: 361-362). The following trends are suggested in this literature:

<i>More important with age</i>	<i>Less important with age</i>
security	intrinsic work
social relationships	developing abilities
comfort	advancement opportunities
service	pleasure

Some of these—for example, the increase in the importance of security and the decrease in the importance of developing abilities and advancement opportunities—decrease in the importance of age: it would be curious if we did not find them. In fact, we would have to wonder about the validity of our measuring instruments. The others, the increasing importance of social relationships and comfort and the decreasing importance of intrinsic work, are less obvious, although they correspond with psychological theories about interest shifts during life (for example, Lieving, 1976).

For HERMES, separate work goal importance scores for four age brackets (20-29, 30-39, 40-49, and 50-59) were computed for five large categories of employees covering the full range of status and educational levels: managers, professionals, branch office technicians, clerks, and unskilled workers (all 1971-1973 data).

For each goal and age bracket, the deviation from the mean of all four age brackets (expressed in standardized score points) has been calculated; first for the five employee categories separately, then means across the five categories have been computed. These means are shown in Figure 8.5, which therefore presents in concise form the relationship between age bracket and work goal importance, as found for about 40,000 HERMES employees from all countries and a wide range of occupations.

We see in Figure 8.5 the following trends in HERMES:

<i>More important with age</i>	<i>Less important with age</i>
employment security	advancement
benefits	training
manager	earnings
cooperation	challenge
	personal time

More or less fluctuating scores are found for desirable area, physical conditions, and use of skills, while virtually no age effect at all is visible for recognition and freedom.

The HERMES findings (based on an international respondent population) thus confirm largely the trends found in the literature. The "comfort" goals—desirable area and physical conditions,—do not increase monotonously with age, but they do increase. For "service" and "pleasure" the HERMES questionnaire has no items (but "pleasure," like "personal time," is part of the individualism syndrome). Had we looked at the five employee categories separately, we would have seen that lower educated employees worry about "employment security" at an earlier age and lose their interest in "challenge" and "training" earlier. Professionals and clerks show an

interest in "cooperation," which is much less dependent on age than is the case for the other three employee categories. Living in a desirable area is particularly important for the 40-49 age bracket regardless of education and job level.

Individualism and Masculinity Shifts by Age Group

The last column of Figure 8.5 shows whether each of the 14 work facets is primarily related to IDV or to MAS, and in what sense. We see that the age effects for all facets most closely related to MAS point in the direction of decreasing masculinity with increasing age (for "Recognition," the relationship is marginal). For IDV, the picture is more ambiguous. "Use of Skills" and "Training" point to increasing indi-

FIGURE 8.5 Differences of Standardized Mean Scores for the Importance of 14 Work Goals, Between Each of Four Age Groups and Their Common Mean, Averaged Across Five Large Employee Categories

Work goals	20-29	30-39	40-49	50-59	Most closely associated dimension of corresponding age effect
JOB CONTENT AND LEARNING					
Challenge	+42	+28	-20	-51	-MAS
Use of skills	+28	-8	0	-21	+IDV
Training	+103	+4	-36	-72	+IDV
REWARD					
Recognition	+4	+7	-5	-5	±MAS
Advancement	+149	+50	-60	-140	-MAS
Earnings	+50	+45	-31	-64	-MAS
INTERPERSONAL RELATIONS					
Manager	-47	-19	+16	+50	-MAS
Cooperation	-27	-14	+13	+27	-MAS
Freedom	-5	+5	-1	+2	±IDV
SECURITY					
Employment security	-114	-22	+61	+74	-MAS
Benefits	-63	-29	+3	+88	-IDV
COMFORT					
Personal Time	+25	+13	-1	-37	-IDV
Desirable Area	-60	-5	+46	+19	-MAS
Physical Conditions	-31	-43	-7	+80	-IDV

The categories are: managers, professionals, branch office technicians, clerks, and unskilled workers. Total number of respondents 39,973; worldwide data, 1971-1973.

individualism with increasing age; "Benefits," "Personal Time," and "Physical Conditions" point to decreasing individualism with increasing age. The IDV score for a given age group is therefore not a meaningful index; it is composed of a different mix of goals for different age groups. I have computed it anyway and plotted it in Figure 8.6 because I see no other way of succinctly showing the age and trend effects of this group of work goals in one diagram.

Figure 8.6 is analogous to Figures 8.2 and 8.3, except that (1) it shows on the vertical axes an index score rather than the score for a single question, and (2) it covers only the five employee categories that were surveyed twice. We find for all




FIGURE 8.6 Individualism (IDV) Scores for Five Large Categories of Employees, Worldwide Data, by Age Group, at Two Points in Time

five groups a relatively flat age curve, which, however, in most cases is inverted U-shaped: The youngest and oldest age categories are less individualistic (but we have seen in Figure 8.5 that this is due to *different* work goals for the young and for the old). There is a strong *Zeitgeist* effect which has affected all age brackets for the managers and professionals (they have all become much more individualist from 1967-1969 to 1971-1973) and the younger age brackets of technicians, clerks, and secretaries; as in Figure 8.2 we see that the older, less educated employees have not followed the trends in society so much, while the older, more educated employees have followed them closely.




FIGURE 8.7 Masculinity (MAS) Scores for Five Large Categories of Employees, Worldwide Data, by Age Group, at Two Points in Time

In Figure 8.7 I have plotted the MAS scores by age bracket for the same five employee categories. The curves in Figure 8.7 contrast with those in Figure 8.6. We see a strong dependency of masculinity on age: it reaches a peak for the 20-29 age bracket and then monotonously decreases; this is even true for the secretaries and typists (who are nearly all female). However, the *Zeitgeist* effect is much weaker than was the case for IDV, and it is negative for the older managers, technicians, and secretaries. Especially those in the 20-29 and 30-39 age brackets between 1967-1969 and 1971-1973 have become more masculine. Those over 40 were less masculine in 1967-1969, and they remained so or became even less masculine in 1971-1973.

Gradually, from age 25 to age 50, men and women at work reorient themselves with respect to the values which I associated with the Masculinity-Femininity continuum. Self-assertion (advancement, earnings, challenging work) becomes less important; security, environment (desirable area), and social relationships (manager, co-operation) become more important. Moreover, differences in these values between men and women disappear. Let us compare from Figure 8.7 two employee categories with roughly equal educational levels: branch office technicians (all male) and secretaries and typists (all female). Comparing their 1971-1973 MAS scores for the 20-29 and the 50-59 age brackets, we find:

technicians, 20-29: MAS = 76,
secretaries, 20-29: MAS = 29,
technicians, 50-59: MAS = -19,
secretaries, 50-59: MAS = -17.

The gap of almost 50 points on the MAS scale between the male technicians and the female secretaries in the 20-29 age bracket has completely disappeared for the 50-59-year-olds. Lannon (1977: 11) remarks that sex role behaviors become blurred as men and women reach middle age. This can be felt as a liberation, especially for those who may have always wanted to engage in non-sex-typical behavior, but felt constrained by society to the traditional role: women who suppressed their professional talents in an ill-fitting housewife role, or men who like to care for others, cook, or knit.

Speculations on Longer-Term Trends

This chapter has so far shown that the indices PDI, UAI, IDV, and MAS which were designed to compare the societal norms of countries at one point in time are not necessarily the best indices for measuring trends over time, because the questions used to compose each index are about issues that do not necessarily shift together. In the case of PDI and UAI, I have therefore focused on the one question from each index which showed the largest shift in scores between the 1967-1969 and 1971-1973 HERMES data. I found clear evidence of decreasing preferences for an autocratic or persuasive superior (which suggests lower power distances) and increasing stress at work (which suggests higher uncertainty avoidance). In the case of IDV and MAS, the questions composing the indices shifted sufficiently homogeneously to allow using the indices themselves as trend indicators; we found a sharp increase in individualism and a weaker increase in masculinity. All these shifts occur in a sufficient majority of countries to consider them as dominant worldwide trends, although a few individual countries in each case show shifts in opposite directions. The effect of

these is to widen the gaps among individual country scores. The HERMES data on the four trend indicators used show only for the preferred manager (PDI) a somewhat smaller gap between extreme countries in 1971-1973 than in 1967-1969; in the three other cases, country scores showed a divergence over time rather than a convergence; the differences between extreme countries in stress (UAI), individualism, and masculinity were larger in 1971-1973 than in 1967-1969.

The time span covered by the HERMES data—from around 1968 to around 1972—is four years, obviously a very short period for concluding about longer-term trends; a period marked by specific historical events (such as the 1968 student revolt in France and the Vietnam war) which may have affected societal norms in specific ways and made extrapolations less valid.

If I have to speculate about longer-term trends than just those for 1968-1972, the easiest dimension to extrapolate is Individualism. This showed a remarkably strong shift toward larger IDV scores in 1971-1973. I referred earlier to the strong association between IDV and national wealth. We can assume that as long as the wealth of nations increases, the individualism of their citizens will increase. The consequences for individualism of a levelling off into zero growth are more difficult to forecast. Individualism may continue to increase for some time, but it is also possible that it stabilizes; I find it less likely that it will decrease, as this would mean that differentiated societies would become less differentiated. The differentiation process may well be irreversible.

If national wealth increases, the causal chain of Figure 3.8 leads to predicting a reduction in PDI, or at least in some of the components of PDI, such as the need for dependence, which expresses itself in the preference for an autocratic or persuasive boss. However, we have seen that in countries in which at present large power distances are the norm, the desire for a less dependent subordinate-superior relationship is hardly honored. Unfortunately, this cannot but lead to power strife in many of these countries. Only the growth of the middle classes, with a concomitant reduction in the general Power Distance norm, offers perspectives of a gradual reduction in violence and repression.

The lower-PDI countries are better prepared to cope with a desire for power equalization, but they may increasingly face a different dilemma. The harmony and pluralist philosophy on which their societal relationships are based works well in a period of overall economic expansion (Scott, 1974), but may no longer apply in a zero-growth world. It has still to be proved whether in such a situation structures based on low power distances can continue to be functional. One "solution," well known in many abortive attempts at democratization, is to escape into bureaucracy: to shift on the dimension of uncertainty avoidance. Everything is fixed by formal rules until no one has any power left, except those who can anonymously twist the system (Crozier, 1964a; Luhmann, 1975: 94). Another possibility is a reversal into higher power distances according to the French example. A great deal of organizational ingenuity will be needed to create or maintain low power distances if the road to expansion is blocked.

As far as long-term trends in uncertainty avoidance are concerned, the data shown by Lynn and Hampson for the 1935-1970 period (page 239) suggest that at least the anxiety (stress) component in UAI may be subject to long-term oscillations. The wave-length of such oscillations may be somewhere between 25 and 40 years.

According to Lynn and Hampson, 1935 and 1950 were years of high anxiety, and it is likely that in the intermediary World War II years anxiety reached a peak. The post-war period saw a reduction in anxiety, accompanied by optimism.⁷ Lynn and Hampson show that since 1965, anxiety is again on the increase. A survey of images of the future in 10 European countries (both East and West) in 1967-1968 demonstrated deep pessimism (Galtung, 1976). The 1973 oil crisis and the 1974 recession are in themselves further anxiety-reinforcing phenomena; while the accompanying pessimism by itself reinforces the recession. ISR (1979) summarized the results of a longitudinal study of mental health in the United States comparing representative samples of the population in 1957 versus 1976. They show on average no decrease in the sense of happiness and well-being but more worry, especially among the young; sleeplessness, nervousness, headaches, loss of appetite, and upset stomachs.

One illustrative trend investigation covering a more recent period (1973-1977) was published for the Federal Republic of Germany by a market research firm, the Leo Burnett Company (Burnett, 1977). It used samples of 4400 men and women in 1973 and 6200 in 1977. The surveys are part of the firm's "Life Style Research." The shifts that occurred in Germany between 1973 and 1977, suggest a continued increase in uncertainty avoidance, for example:

- "It isn't worthwhile to get involved in politics, one cannot change anything": increase for women from 33 to 36 percent, for men from 25 to 28 percent.
- "Occasional spanking of children is O.K.": increased for women from 36 to 53 percent and for men from 36 to 54 percent (!)

Other questions in the Burnett survey suggest that besides uncertainty avoidance, masculinity also continued to increase in the Federal Republic of Germany in the 1973-1977 period (compare Chapter 6), for example:

- "In favor of equal rights for women: decrease for women from 80 to 77 percent, for men from 74 to 69 percent.
- "If one has been successful and makes money, one should not be bashful about showing it": increase for women from 35 to 42 percent, for men from 37 to 42 percent.

The data show that both men and women in the Federal Republic of Germany between 1973 and 1977 shifted toward more masculine values, while at the same time the support for a traditional type of sex role differentiation has increased. No progress for women's liberation, or for men's liberation, for that matter.

On another issue related to masculinity—foreign development aid—and for another (Masculine) country—Great Britain—Bowles (1978) shows a decrease of public support for development aid from 1969 to 1978. In a survey in 1969, 62 percent of respondents favored Britain aiding poorer nations; in 1978 this was reduced to 46 percent. This can be ascribed to Britain's economic difficulties; but it can also reflect an increase in masculinity.

At the present time, I do not dispose of other recent trend data that would justify expanding the conclusions to more countries and a longer period. I have no clues as to which way country masculinity norms will move in the long run; I suppose that the wide differences which we notice at present will continue to exist.

The combination of a continued increase in anxiety, combined with an increase in masculinity—if it were to apply to most nations in our world—offers a far from

attractive perspective. Neither high anxiety nor a hypertrophy of masculine assertiveness in a nation is helpful in creating the conditions under which wise political decisions are made: the decisions about disarmament, stopping nuclear proliferation, saving scarce and irreplaceable resources, and a more equal distribution of wealth over the countries of the world which are prerequisites for our common survival. The phenomenon of the anxiety fluctuations is a painful example of the "inner limits of mankind" which threaten our existence more than the limits to growth imposed from the outside (Laszlo, 1978). More than by disasters of nature, human existence is threatened by "disasters of culture."

NOTES

1. As we saw in Chapter 3, PDI has not been computed from the percentage preferring manager 1 or 2 but from the percentage preferring manager 3 in the 1967-1969 formulation, reversing the sign. As this measure was only available for one survey round, it could not be used to show a trend over time. The description of manager 1 and 2 did not change from 1967-1969 to 1971-1973.
2. In France in the period 1954-1972, income inequalities increased (CERC, 1976).
3. These data do not confirm Mead's (1978) analysis of the Generation Gap as a one-time, worldwide shift for all those born after 1945. An example of a study that equally used longitudinal plus age cohort data and found a generation and *not* a maturation effect is Abramson (1971). The variable he analyzed was a different one, however: class-based voting in four large European countries.
4. Due to World War II, data for 1940 and 1945 were not available for several countries in their sample.
5. The year of highest anxiety per country was as follows: 1935: FIN, SWI, USA; 1950: AUT, DEN, FRA, GER, ITA, JAP, NET, NOR; 1955: BEL, SWE; 1960: none; 1965: none; 1970: AUL, CAN, GBR, IRE, NZL.
6. HERMES stress scores and Lynn's anxiety scores are rank correlated with .72***.
7. Saavy (1966: 137) attributes the increase of the birth rates in most developed countries after World War II (well beyond a short-term "baby boom") to a general spirit of optimism.

Chapter 9

There Are No Universal Solutions to Organization and Management Problems

Chapters 3 through 6 have demonstrated four ways in which national cultures can be distinguished. They illustrate that different nations have different cultural heritages which are largely invisible. The invisible part consists of values, collectively held by a majority of the population (but possibly differentiated by social class), and transferred from generation to generation through education and early life experience in family and schools and through socialization in organizations and institutions. These values have thus grown into societal norms which, in their turn, determine to a large extent the political and organizational solutions which are feasible within that particular national culture. No political or organizational system can survive long without some degree of member consensus, unless it is continually supported by outside force.

I hold that the stability of national cultures over long periods of history is achieved through a system of constant reinforcement, because societal norms lead to particular political, organizational, and intellectual structures and processes, and these in turn lead to self-fulfilling prophecies in people's perceptions of reality,¹ which reinforce the societal norms. It is difficult to recognize this process in one's own culture. A deep and often painfully acquired empathy with other cultures is required before one becomes sensitive to the range of societal norms which our genus *homo sapiens* has been able to invent and to the relativity of our society's norms. We find this eloquently expressed in the quote from Pascal at the beginning of this book: "There are truths on this side of the Pyrenees which are falsehoods on the other."

Organization and management theorists have rarely taken Pascal's wisdom to heart. In the management literature there are numerous unquestioning extrapolations of organizational solutions beyond the border of the country in which they were developed. This is especially true for the exportation of management theories from the United States to the rest of the world, for which the non-U.S. importers are at least as responsible as the U.S. exporters. "Management" itself is very much an American concept, just as earlier the entire discipline of economics was very much an Anglo-Saxon discipline.² However, the empirical basis for American management theories is American organizations; and we should not assume without proof that they apply elsewhere. This assumption is not found only in the popular literature: In scholarly journals—even in those explicitly addressing an international readership—the silent assumption of universal validity of culturally restricted findings is frequent. Articles in such journals often do not even mention the country in which the data were collected (which usually is the United States as can be concluded from the affiliations of the author). As a matter of scientific etiquette, I suggest that any article written for an international public should mention the country—and time period—in which the data were collected.

A similar naiveté with regard to foreign solutions is often found among journalists and political writers, whether they want to export German-type Mitbestimmung to France, Swedish job reform to Italy, Yugoslav worker self-management to Holland, or Mao communism to Angola. There exists a widespread tendency to underestimate the importance of deeply rooted societal norms for arriving at political or organiza-

CONSEQUENCES FOR POLICY AND RESEARCH

SUMMARY OF THIS CHAPTER

On behalf of policy makers in organizations, this chapter resumes the practical conclusions that can be drawn from the findings in this book. The main finding is that organizations are culture-bound. This applies not only to the behavior of people within organizations and to the functioning of organizations as a whole; even the theories developed to explain behavior in organizations reflect the national culture of their author, and so do the methods and techniques that are suggested for the management of organizations. The consequences of this cultural relativity are described for a number of areas: motivation, leadership, and decision-making, Management By Objectives, planning and control, organization design, Management Development and Organization Development, humanization of work, industrial democracy, company ownership and control, and, finally, the reaction of the local environment to organizations. The next part of the chapter is devoted to the management of multinational organizations: in particular, multinational corporations and international organizations. The importance of a strong internal subculture of such organizations for their effective functioning is stressed. Possibilities of training people for productive collaboration across cultures are described. Finally, the chapter indicates areas for continued research into cultural differences among nations. It introduces a "Values Survey Module" which is an improved and shortened version of the HERMES values questions, and a questionnaire to the reader of this book.

tional solutions which will work and be stable. But, to rephrase a famous dictum: There is nothing as impractical as a bad theory.

This does not mean that countries cannot learn from each other: On the contrary, looking across the border is one of the most effective ways of getting new ideas in the area of management, organization, or politics. However, applying these in one's own setting calls for prudence and judgment.

In the present chapter I shall try to translate the conclusions of this book into recommendations for practical policy, on behalf of those trying to manage or control organizations in the widest sense of the word—public, voluntary, private, or informal. This means that I have to go two steps beyond the relatively safe ground of measured data. One step was made in the integrated interpretations of dispersed findings in Chapter 3 through 6. The second step has to be made now, and it implies a reinterpretation with a view toward applicability.³

Resistances to Cultural Relativism

Cultural relativism is not a popular subject.⁴ I regularly participate in international discussion groups at scholarly meetings. After one has been sensitized to it, it is impossible not to recognize the cultural influence on the interest areas and points of view taken by Scandinavians, French, Americans, Germans, British, Italians, and Dutch participants, not to mention the cultural influence on their ways of presenting their ideas. Yet I noticed that drawing attention to the cultural component in our points of view is a risky strategy which suddenly puts the entire discussion into perspective. Others, however, reject the notion of a cultural component rigorously, become upset, and feel threatened by it. "Possibly one of the many reasons why the culture concept has been resisted," Hall (1960: 50) writes, "is that it throws doubt on many established beliefs. Fundamental beliefs . . . are shown to vary widely from one culture to the next. It is easier to avoid the idea of the culture concept than to face up to it." In addition, "the concepts of culture . . . touch upon such intimate matters that they are often brushed aside at the very point where people begin to comprehend their implications" (1960: 165).

Yet I believe that the battle for the recognition of the cultural component in our ideas is worth being fought. More so now than a generation ago, most of us meet people with cultural backgrounds different from our own and are expected to work with them. If we maintain the naive assumption that because they look like us they also think like us, our joint efforts will not get very far. If we begin to realize that our own ideas are culturally limited, from that moment we need the others—we can never be self-sufficient again. Only others with different mental programs can help us find the limitations of our own. Once we have realized we are blind persons in front of the elephant we can welcome the exchange with other blind persons.

Acceptance of cultural relativism is in itself easier in some cultures than in others. On the level of intellectual discourse (not necessarily on the level of practice) the French have little difficulty. Montaigne and Pascal were French. I know of no other country where a violent criticism of national values like Alain Peyrefitte's *Le Mal Français* (1976) could, first, be written at all and, second, even by a cabinet minister of the majority party who rather than be publicly rebuked would then be admitted to

the country's most illustrious intellectual club (the Académie Française). Perhaps, the French's sublime gift for separating theory and practice allows them to react this way. In Germany, by contrast, any type of relativism is digested with difficulty; the German tradition is to search for absolute truth, and in the sciences of man most of the great theorists of the western world were from the German culture area (Kant, Hegel, Marx, Freud, Weber, and Lewin). Germans can, however, accept the relativity of ideas as part of an absolute truth of a higher order, some *Unzulänglichkeit menschlichen Strebens*.⁵

Sex was the great taboo of the Victorian age. At least in the organization literature, power was the great taboo until the 1960s. Both taboos have been more or less lifted since that time. Culture in the organization literature may be the great taboo of today. In all three cases, the taboo is on something we are all involved in but not supposed to speak about. If this book helps to break the culture taboo, it will have served its purpose.

Motivation

The founding father of motivation theory was Sigmund Freud; but he is rarely quoted in the U.S. management literature on "Motivation." Instead, the popular motivation theorists in the U.S. management literature are David McClelland, Abraham Maslow, Frederick Herzberg, and Victor Vroom.

Freud was Austrian; and there are good reasons in the culture profile of Austria in my data for explaining why his theory would be conceived in Austria rather than elsewhere. According to Freud, we are impelled to act by unconscious forces in us which he calls our "id." Our conscious self-conception, our "ego," tries to control our id; and an again unconscious inner pilot, our "superego," criticizes the thoughts and acts of our ego. Feelings of guilt and anxiety develop when the ego is felt to be giving in to the id. Freud sees the superego as the product of early socialization, mainly by our parents when we were small children. The Austrian culture is characterized by the combination of a very low power distance with a fairly high uncertainty avoidance (Figure 7.2).⁷ The low power distance means that there is no powerful superior who will take away our uncertainties for us; we have to carry them ourselves. Freud's superego now comes natural as an inner uncertainty-absorbing device, an interiorized boss. This is reinforced by the fairly low individualism score of Austria which implies an obligation to the ingroups we belong to. Finally, Austria's high masculinity score may have something to do with Freud's strong concern with sex.

The American culture profile differs from the Austrian by a much lower uncertainty avoidance score and a much higher individualism score. The high individualism implies a "calculative involvement" of the Americans in organizations (see page 153). This explains the popularity in the United States of "expectancy" theories of motivation, which see people as pulled by the expectancy of outcomes, mostly consciously (Vroom, 1964), rather than as pushed by unconscious drives. The low uncertainty avoidance, combined with fairly high masculinity, appeared earlier in this book to be associated with high scores on Need for Achievement according to McClelland (pages 126, 198, and 219). McClelland's achievement motive stands for the value pattern of the masculine risk taker, which corresponds with the U.S. pattern; this explains the popularity in the United States of McClelland's motivation theory. The combination

dent who ordered an investigation (because he was so shocked) was an American, and the three executives were Swedes. The Swedes complained about being frustrated by the company bureaucracy (which reflects a value position of not liking formalization and not liking bigness), but they also mentioned the importance of being able to live where their families wanted to live. Evidently, they were willing to give up prospects of increased earnings for this purpose.

Bartolomé and Evans (1979) published a study on the trade-off between professional and private life for 532 middle managers, mainly from Great Britain, France, and Scandinavia. They write about differences among countries:

The French are slightly more sensitive to career tensions at all stages, possibly a reflection of working as middle managers in relatively structured and authoritarian organizations. Young British managers are particularly insensitive to their marriages, through this changes strongly in the mid-30's, while the Scandinavians are more preoccupied than other nationalities with their wives during their 20's and early 30's. . . . While French managers believe more in a rigid separation of professional and private life—work should not in principle be allowed to interfere with family and leisure—the British executive perceives a fluid and much less clear boundary between the two domains. . . . Their time in private life is spent differently. The British are more passive and companionable, spending time relaxing, doing chores, and simply being together. The French are more active—playing sports, spending time with children, friends, or the extended family. . . . The French feel most "tied down" in their careers, whereas the British and particularly the Scandinavians feel "free." . . . The career strategy of the Frenchman is necessarily more defensive and risk-avoidant, while that of his British counterpart is more aggressive and risk-taking [from Bartolomé and Evans, 1979].

We recognize in this quotation the difference in uncertainty avoidance (which opposes Britain and Scandinavia on the one side to France on the other) but also the differences in masculinity (which opposes Britain to Scandinavia, with France in between).

McClelland (1965) suggested that *achievement motivation training* would be an answer to the problems of underdevelopment in the Third World. He himself tried this in India. Interestingly, Figure 7.4 suggests that India (the Indian middle class) already shares American values about achievement, so McClelland could build on values already present. Pareek (1968), writing on the basis of Indian development practice, proposes, however, that next to achievement motivation his country needs "extension motivation" (concern for other people or the society as a whole) and a reduction of "dependence motivation." Extension motivation will be facilitated by low IDV and low MAS (relative to its wealth, India has a high IDV—see Figure 5.5). Dependence motivation is undoubtedly related to PDI, which is very high for India. All this suggests that "achievement motivation training" should not be seen as a psychological patent medicine against underdevelopment.⁸

Leadership

We saw in Chapter 3 that values about appropriate power distances are present among both superiors and subordinates in a country; therefore, trying to develop "leadership" as if it were an independent characteristic which a person could acquire is naive: Leadership is a complement to subordinateship. This is immediately clear in

of high individualism, low uncertainty avoidance, and masculinity in the United States also explains the popularity of Maslow's Hierarchy of Human Needs. Maslow's supreme category, self-actualization, is a highly individualistic motive. In research done in the mid-1960s among managers from 14 countries by Haire et al., only the American managers ordered their needs almost exactly in the order of Maslow's hierarchy (security-social-esteem-autonomy-self-actualization; see page 59).

Herzberg's popular two-factor theory of motivation claims that there are "motivators" with positive but no negative motivation potential, and "hygienic factors" with negative but no positive motivation potential. The motivators are the "intrinsic" aspects of work—basically those related to Maslow's higher needs: esteem and self-actualization. The hygienic factors are the "extrinsic" aspects—basically those related to Maslow's lower needs: social and security. If Maslow's hierarchy is culturally determined, however, Herzberg's two-factor theory is to a greater degree naturally determined. For example, it has been shown not to apply to Dutch trainees (Hofstede, 1964) and not in a wide variety of work settings in New Zealand (Hines, 1976).

In Chapter 7 I interpreted the diagram of Figure 7.4 as follows: The vertical axis (Uncertainty Avoidance) opposes motivation by success to motivation by security; at the extremes, hope of success to fear of failure. The horizontal axis (Masculinity) opposes ego needs to affiliation needs. Combining the two axes, we get in quadrant:

- (1) (U.S.A., Great Britain, and their former dominions and colonies): Motivation by personal, individual success, in the form of wealth, recognition, and "self-actualization." This is the classic McClelland-Maslow-Herzberg pattern.
- (2) (Japan, German-speaking countries, some Latin countries, and Greece): Motivation by personal, individual security. This can be found in wealth and especially in hard work. Second-quadrant countries have grown fastest economically in the 1960-1970 period (contrary to McClelland's theory).
- (3) (France, Spain, Portugal, Yugoslavia, Chile, and other Latin and Asian countries): Motivation by security and belonging. Individual wealth is less important than group solidarity. It is no accident that Yugoslavia, with its worker self-management system, is in this quadrant.
- (4) (North European countries plus the Netherlands): Motivation by success and belonging. In this quadrant, success will be measured partly as collective success and in the quality of human relationships and the living environment.

We thus arrive at a motivational "map of the world" which is a far cry from a universal order of needs.

The implication of the different motivation patterns in different countries is that personnel policies aiming at motivating people will have different effects in different countries (they may also have different effects within the same country, for different classes of employees!). This is perhaps nowhere as clear as in the different reactions to *career opportunities*. Careers always mean trade-offs between risk and security, between success and family life, and people's career behavior is therefore very much a reflection of cultural values. In an earlier article (Hofstede, 1976c: 44) I told the story of three key executives of a large European corporation who resigned when they were in their early forties, in spite of outstanding career prospects, to accept bigger jobs in smaller local companies. What I did not mention then is that the presi-

the political field: It is difficult to imagine that a Hitler would have been successful in Great Britain, a Churchill in France, or a de Gaulle in Germany. However, it applies equally well to other spheres of life.

Hofstede (1980b: 320) shows that HERMES technicians in France attributed the most positive characteristics to a boss seen as persuasive-paternalistic, those in Great Britain to a boss seen as either persuasive-paternalistic or consultative, and those in Germany to a boss seen as participative. Similar differences among countries have been reported elsewhere. For example, Williams et al. (1966: see page 88) showed that close supervision was associated with more positive attitudes to the boss among Peruvian workers, while the reverse was true for U.S. workers. Meade (1967) repeated in India the classic Lippitt and White (1958) U.S. experiments with school children subjected to authoritarian, democratic, and laissez-faire leadership. He found that both morale and productivity of the children in India were higher under authoritarian leadership, whereas the opposite had been found in the United States. What represents appropriate leadership in one setting does not have to be appropriate for a differently programmed group of subordinates.⁹

One of the oldest theorists of leadership in the world literature is Machiavelli (1469-1527). He described the most effective techniques for manipulation and remaining in power, including deceit, bribery, and murder, which has given him a bad reputation in the centuries afterwards. Machiavelli wrote in the Italy of his day, and what he describes is clearly a large power distance situation. We still find Italy on the larger power distance side of Figure 7.2 (with all other Latin and Mediterranean countries), and we can assume from historical evidence that power distances in Italy in the sixteenth century were still considerably larger.

American theories of leadership are written from a middle-range power distance background (the United States ranks 15 out of 40 on the Power Distance Index). Some of the most popular are McGregor's (1960) Theory Y versus Theory X, Likert's (1967) System 4, and Blake and Mouton's Managerial Grid (Blake et al., 1973). What these theories have in common is that they all advocate participation in the manager's decisions by his or her subordinates (participative management); however, the initiative toward this is supposed to be taken by the manager.

In countries with still lower Power Distance Index values—such as Sweden, Norway, Germany, and Israel—we find considerable sympathy with models of management in which even the initiatives are taken by the subordinates. I shall come back to this later in the section dealing with "Industrial Democracy." These models of management, however, meet little sympathy in the United States where maintaining certain "management prerogatives" is seen as essential. The concept of management prerogatives, again, is not popular in the low power distance countries. This is illustrated by a remark which a Scandinavian social scientist is supposed to have made to Herzberg in a seminar: "You are against participation for the very reason we are in favor of it—one doesn't know where it will stop. We think that is good" (Jenkins, 1973: 258).

If leadership is only a complement to subordinateship, a key to leadership is the type of subordinate expectations we are likely to find in a country. In Figure 9.1 I have listed these for three levels of power distance: the U.S. level is in the middle. American theories of leadership have been widely exported to all parts of the world,

in a normative way, without cultural provisos. They have been taught to foreigners in business schools, they have been packaged into training kits and sold to companies and organizations abroad. However, neither McGregor nor Likert nor Blake and Mouton nor any other U.S. leadership theorist I know has taken the collective values of subordinates into account. We found evidence in the present study that agreement with McGregor's Theory X is more frequently found among subordinates in large power distance countries (page 82), that Likert's participative management is less popular in some countries than in others, and that the perceived leadership behavior between "task"- and "people"-orientation (Blake and Mouton) is a function of the country's power distance level (page 82). The only U.S. theory of leadership which allows for a certain amount of cultural relativity, although indirectly, is Fiedler's (1967) Contingency Theory of Leadership: Fiedler states that different leader personalities are needed for "difficult" and "easy" situations, and a cultural gap between superior and subordinates is one of the factors that makes a situation "difficult." However, his theory does not consider the *kind* of cultural gap.¹⁰

FIGURE 9.1 Subordinateship for Three Levels of Power Distance

Small Power Distance	Medium Power Distance (USA)	Large Power Distance
Subordinates have weak dependence needs.	Subordinates have medium dependence needs.	Subordinates have strong dependence needs.
Superiors have weak dependence needs toward their superiors.	Superiors have medium dependence needs toward their superiors.	Superiors have strong dependence needs toward their superiors.
Subordinates expect superiors to consult them and may rebel or strike if superiors are not seen as staying within their legitimate role.	Subordinates expect superiors to consult them but will accept autocratic behavior as well.	Subordinates expect superiors to act autocratically.
Ideal superior to most is a loyal democrat.	Ideal superior to most is a resourceful democrat.	Ideal superior to most is a benevolent autocrat or a paternalist.
Laws and rules apply to all, and privileges for superiors are not considered acceptable.	Laws and rules apply to all but a certain level of privileges for superiors is judged as normal.	Everyone expects superiors to enjoy privileges; laws and rules differ for superiors and subordinates.
Status symbols are frowned upon and will easily come under attack from subordinates.	Status symbols for superiors contribute moderately to their authority and will be accepted by subordinates.	Status symbols are very important and contribute strongly to the superior's authority with the subordinates.

What happens in practice when U.S. theories are taught abroad—and this I infer from personal experience and observation—is that the theories preached are not practiced. The wise managers, however, still learn; but they perform a *cultural transposition* of the ideas to make them fit the values of their subordinates. The less wise managers who do not recognize the need for cultural transpositions may once try an unflinching approach, find out it does not work, and fall back into their old routine.

Attempts at the transfer of leadership skills which do not take the values of subordinates into account have little chance of success. This is a pity, because managers (and subordinates) all over the world need to learn, and we can learn much from other countries, including the American example. Countries at different levels of economic development, with different social structures, economic systems, institutions, and values try to take over the same new technologies. Technologies are not neutral with regard to values: In order to work, they assume that certain values are respected. Making these technologies work means that people in the receiving countries must learn new leadership and subordinateship skills, change old institutions, and shift their values. However, this will not be achieved by ignoring them. Cultural transposition, in the ideal case, means finding a new cultural synthesis which retains from the old local values those elements deemed essential but which allows the new technologies to function. Probably the country which has most successfully done this so far is Japan; a country where it has clearly failed is Iran.

The cultural limitations to leadership approaches have their consequence for the way company policies will work: for example, in the area of *grievance channels*, ways in which lower-level organization members can bring their complaints forward to those at the top of the organization. Grievance channels in large power distance environments will be difficult to establish: subordinates will fear retaliation (and superiors will in fact try to retaliate); there will be more unrealistic and exaggerated grievances, and the channels may be used for personal revenge against a superior who is not accessible otherwise.

What happens if within a multicultural organization managers move to other countries? The adaptation of a manager to a higher power distance environment does not seem to offer many problems. Managers in all settings probably learn to behave as autocratically as their subordinates allow them. Although this is an unpopular message and seldom professed in management development courses, managers moving to a large power distance culture soon learn that they have to behave more autocratically in order to be effective, and they do so: The colonial history of most western countries provides many examples of this. It is interesting that the western ex-colonial power which itself has the highest Power Distance norm—France—seems to be most appreciated by its former colonies and to maintain the best postcolonial relationships with most of them. This suggests that subordinates in a large power distance culture still feel more comfortable with superiors who are real autocrats than with those acting as autocrats for opportunistic reasons.

The operation of a manager in an environment with a Power Distance norm lower than his own is more problematic. It is easier to move toward more than to move toward less autocratic behavior. French and other Latin managers, unless they are exceptionally culturally sensitive, tend to have problems in Anglo or Nordic countries. American managers usually find it difficult to collaborate wholeheartedly in the

"industrial democracy" process of countries like Sweden, Germany, or even the Netherlands. U.S. citizens tend to consider their country as the example of democracy and find it difficult to accept that other countries may want to develop forms of democracy for which they feel no need and which make major inroads into management prerogatives.

Leadership and decision-making styles are also affected by a country's position on the Masculinity Index. The following case is illustrative: A prestigious U.S. consulting firm was asked to analyze the decision-making processes in the large Scandinavian XYZ corporation. In their report, they criticized the corporation's decision-making style, which they characterized as, among other things, "intuitive"- and "consensus-based." They opposed "observations of traditional XYZ practices" to "selected examples of practices in other companies." These "selected examples" offered as a model evidently were taken from their U.S. clients and reflect the U.S. textbook norm: "fact-based" rather than intuitive management and "fast decisions based on clear responsibilities" rather than the use of informal, personal contacts and the concern for consensus.

Is this consulting firm doing its Scandinavian clients a service? Where the U.S. and the Scandinavian cultures most widely diverge is on the Masculinity dimension. The use of intuition and the concern for consensus in Scandinavia are "feminine" characteristics of the culture, well embedded in the total texture of these societies. Stressing "facts" and "clear responsibilities" fit the "masculine" U.S. culture. From a neutral viewpoint, there are as good reasons for criticizing the American decision-making style as the Scandinavian style. In complex decision-making situations "facts" no longer exist independently from the people who define them, so "fact-based management" becomes a misleading slogan; intuition may not be a bad method of deciding in such cases. And if, for their implementation, decisions need the commitment of many people, a consensus process, even if it takes more time, is an asset rather than a liability. However, the essential thing overlooked by the consultant is that decisions have to be made in a way that corresponds to the values of the environment in which they have to be effective. People in this consulting firm lacked insight into their own cultural biases. This does not mean that the Scandinavian corporation management need not improve its decision-making and that it could not learn from the consultant's experience. However, this can be done only through a mutual recognition of cultural differences, not by ignoring them. As one XYZ manager put it, "they looked at us through American glasses and discovered we don't operate the American way. What did they expect?"

Management By Objectives (MBO)

MBO may be the single most popular post-World War II American-born management technique. It is based on a cybernetic control-by-feedback philosophy. Probably its earliest advocate is Peter Drucker (1955: chap. 11). In the United States MBO has been a way of spreading a pragmatic results orientation throughout the organization. It has been considerably more successful where results are objectively measurable than where results are a matter of subjective interpretation (Hofstede, 1978b). It has also been criticized in the United States as industrial engineering with a new